Call it the first distinction.
This distinction is not as old as religion itself, though at first sight it might seem plausible to say that every religion produces "pagans" just as every civiliza tion generates "barbarians." But cultures and their constructions of identity not only generate otherness but also develop techniques of translation. 3 Of course, the "real other" is always there beyond myself and my constructions of selfhood and otherness. It is the "constructed other" that is, to a certain degree, compen sated by techniques of translation. Translation in this sense is not to be confused with the colonializing appropriation of the "real" other. Rather, it is an attempt to make more transparent the borders erected by cultural distinctions. Ancient polytheisms functioned as such a technique of translation within the "ancient world" as an ecumene of interconnected nations.^ The polytheistic reli gions overcame the ethnocentrism of tribal religions by distinguishing several deities by name, shape, and function. The names, the shapes of the gods, and the forms of worship differed. But the functions were strikingly similar, especially in the case of cosmic deities: the sun god of one religion was easily equated to the sun god of another religion, and so forth. In Mesopotamia, the practice of trans lating divine names goes back to the third millennium. In the second millennium it was extended to many different languages and civilizations of the Near East. Plutarch generalizes, in his treatise on Isis and Osiris, that there are always com mon cosmic phenomena behind the differing divine names: the sun, the moon, the heaven, the earth, the sea, and so on. Because all people live in the same world, they adore the same gods, the lords of this world:
Nor do we regard the gods as different among different peoples nor as barbarian and Greek and as southern and northern. But just as the sun, moon, heaven, earth and sea are common to all, though they are given various names by the varying peoples, so it is with the one reason (logos) which orders these things and the one providence which has charge of them, and the assistant powers which ai e assigned to everything: they are given different honours and modes of address among different peoples according to custom, and they use hallowed symbols. . . . 5 The divine names are translatable because they are conventional and because there is always a referent serving as a tertium comparationis. The cultures, lan guages, customs may be different: religions always have a common ground. The gods were international because they were cosmic, and while different peoples worshiped different gods, nobody contested the reality of foreign gods and the legitimacy of foreign forms of worship. The distinction in question did not exist in the world of polytheistic and tribal religions.
The space "severed or cloven" by the Mosaic distinction was not simply the space of religion in general, then, but that of a very specific kind of religion. We may call this a "counterreligion" because it not only constructed but rejected and repudiated everything that went before and everything outside itself as "pagan ism." It no longer functioned as a means of intercultural translation; on the con trary, it functioned as a means of intercultural estrangement. Whereas polytheism or rather, "cosmotheism," rendered different cultures mutually transparent and compatible, the new counterreligion blocked intercultural translatability. False gods cannot be translated.
Usually the fundamental distinction between truth and falsity assumes the form of a "grand narrative" underlying and informing innumerable concrete tellings and retellings of the past. Books 2 through 5 of the Pentateuch unfold the Mosaic distinction in both a narrative and a normative form. Narratively, the distinction is presented in the story of Israel's exodus, whereby Egypt came to represent the rejected, the religiously false, the "pagan." Egypt's most conspicuous property, the worship of images, thus became its greatest sin. Normatively, the distinction is expressed in a code of Law that confirms the narrative by giving the prohibition of "idolatry" first priority. The worship of images comes to be re garded as the absolute horror, falsehood, and apostasy. Polytheism and idolatry, in turn, are seen as one and the same form of religious error: images are "other gods" because the true god is invisible and cannot be iconically represented. The second commandment is hence a commentary on the first:
1. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 2. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image.
The Exodus story, however, is more than simply an account of historical events, and the Law is more than merely a basis for social order and religious purity. In addition to what they overtly tell and establish, they symbolize the Mo saic distinction. Exodus, the Law, Moses, the whole constellation of Israel and Egypt are symbolic figures for all kinds of oppositions.
1 ' The leading one, however, is the distinction between true religion and idolatry; in the course of Jewish history both the concept of idolatry and the repudiation of it grew stronger. The later the texts, the more elaborate the scorn and abomination they pour over the idol aters. In Tacitus, the characterization of Jewish monotheism as a counterreligion is already complete. Moses founded a religion opposed to the rites of other people: the Jews "consider everything that we keep sacred as profane and permit every thing that for us is taboo" [profana illic omnia quae apud nos sacra, rursum con cessa apud illos quae nobis incesta]. In their temples they consecrate a statue of a donkey and sacrifice a ram in contumeliam Ammonis, "in order to ridicule the god Amun." For the same reason, they sacrifice a bull because the Egyptians worship Apis. As the inversion of Egyptian tradition, Jewish religion is totally derivative of and dependent on Egypt."'
It is important to realize that we are dealing here with a mutual loathing rooted not in some idiosyncratic aversions between Jews and Egyptians but in the Mosaic distinction that, in its first occurrence, was Akhenaten's distinction. It is true that many arguments of the "idolaters" have lived on in the discourse of anti Semitism." In this sense, the struggle against the Mosaic distinction had anti Semitic implications. However, it is also true that many of those (such as John Toland or Gotthold Ephraim Lessing) who in the eighteenth century attacked the distinction f ought for tolerance and equality for the Jews; in this sense, the strug gle against the Mosaic distinction assumes the character of a struggle against anti Semitism. The most outspoken destroyer of the Mosaic distinction was, after all, a Jew, Sigmund Freud. Moreover, in the debate between iconoclasts and idolaters, the Christian church sided with the Jews and inherited the repudiation of idolatry by continuing to denigrate pagan religion. Attacks, therefore, against the Mosaic distinction concerned the Christian church as well as Judaism and Islam.' 2 These attacks took the form of a redefinition that attempted to relativize or minimize the distinction. "Normative inversion," which explains one field as just the inverted reflection of its opposing field, is the earliest of these redefinitions.
Strangely enough, however, the principle of normative inversion is not only evoked by "pagan" writers who had their reasons to destroy the distinction. It also recurs about a millennium later in the exact center of the Jewish tradition, as an element of Jewish selfdefinition and selfinterpretation. Starting from this sur prising reemergence of the principle of normative inversion, the f ollowing para graphs outline some of the more important redefinitions to which the Mosaic distinction was exposed in the history of Enlightenment from Moses Maimonides to Freud.
Normative Inversion
The principle of normative inversion provides the main method of legal interpretation for Maimonides in his Guide of the Perplexed. 13 13 a withdrawal therapy for Sabian idolatry, which he understands as a kind of collective or epidemic addiction. The most efficient way to erase a memory is to superimpose a countermemory; hence, the best way to make people forget an idolatrous rite is to replace it with another rite. The Christians followed the same principle when they built their churches on the ruins of pagan temples and observed their feasts on the dates of pagan festivals. For the same reason, Moses (or divine "cunning and wisdom," manifesting itself through his agency) 16 had to install all kinds of dietary and sacrificial prescriptions in order to occupy the terrain held by the Sabians and their idolatrous ways, "so that all these rites and cults that they practiced for the sake of the idols, they now came to practice in the honor of god." 17 The divine strategy was so successful that the Sabians and their once mighty community fell into complete oblivion. Maimonides was no historian. He was interested in the historical circum stances of the Law only insofar as they elucidated its meaning, that is, the intention of the legislator. 18 He contends that the original intention of the Law was to de stroy idolatry and demonstrates this by reconstructing the historical circumstantiae of the Sabians. Then he generalizes the crime of idolatry to fit metahistorical problems and arrives at his wellknown, purely philosophical, and ahistorical con cept of idolatry. For Maimonides, the Law remains enforced, despite its historical circumstances, because of the timeless danger of idolatry.
Translation: Hieroglyphs into Laws
Five hundred years after Maimonides, his project of a historical expla nation of the Law was explicitly taken up by the Christian scholar who opens the second section of our story. John Spencer (163093) was a scholar of Hebrew and, after 1667, master of Corpus Christi College at Cambridge. In his book on the Ritual Law, Spencer mentions Maimonides always with the greatest admira tion. 19 He fully agrees with Maimonides in seeing the principle and overall pur pose of the Law as the destruction of idolatry, which he also views as an addiction to be cured by a withdrawal program. He even applies Maimonides' principle of normative inversion in a considerable number of cases. But he deviates from Maimonides in two respects. First, he draws altogether different conclusions from this kind of historical explanation, since he makes his method that of historical, not legal, reasoning. For him, not only the circumstances, but also the intentions or reasons of the Law are historical and belong to the past. Maimonides took the Law's destruction of idolatry to be a timeless (or metahistorical) task; only the circumstances of its first formulation and application were historical. For Spencer, the reason for the Law is historical as well. 20 With the cessation of idolatry, the Law lost its validity and the Mosaic distinction changed its character. This is, of course, the Christian idea of progress. The second divergence from Maimonides is much more revolutionary and depends on the principle of translation. 21 This paradigm shift shattered the foun dation of the Mosaic distinction between true and false in religion. Like Maimon ides, Spencer held that God did not inscribe his Law on a tabula rasa but, rather, that he carefully overwrote an existing inscription. Unlike Maimonides, however, Spencer takes this original inscription to be Egyptian rather than Sabian: it is more of an intended subtext, or even a kind of "golden ground," for the Law, than an antitext to be wiped out or covered up. The idea is that God intentionally brought Israel into Egypt in order to give His people an Egyptian foundation, and that He chose Moses as His prophet because he was brought up in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. 22 Moses "translated" a good deal of Egyptian wisdom into his laws and institutions, which can only be explained if reintegrated into their original context. Translatio ("transfer," "borrowing") refers not to texts, but to rites and customs that are received from Egypt in order to be preserved as containers of original wisdom, rather than to be supplanted and eventually overcome. Spencer subscribed to the conventional theory about hieroglyphic writing based on Hor apollon's two books on hieroglyphs, 2 ' and especially on Athanasius Kircher's "de cipherments." 24 According to this theory, hieroglyphs were iconic symbols that referred to concepts. They were used exclusively for religious purposes, such as transmitting the "mystic" ideas that were to be kept secret from the common people. Similarly, for Spencer, a good many of the laws, rites, and institutions that God, by the mediation of Moses, gave to his people, show this hieroglyphic char acter. The Law appears here as a "veil" (velum), a "cover" (involucrum), or a "shell" Cudworth wants to conf ute atheism by proving that the recognition of one Supreme Being constitutes "the true intellectual system of the universe" be cause-as Lord Herbert of Cherbury had already shown in 1624-the notion "that there is a Supreme God" is the most common notion of all. 27 Even atheism conforms with this notion: the god whose existence it negates is precisely this one Supreme God and not one or all of the gods of polytheism. This notion, common to theists and atheists alike, can be defined as: "A Perfect Conscious Understanding Being (or Mind) Existing of it self from Eternity, and the Cause of all other things." 28 Especially interesting for our concern is Cudworth's claim that the idea of one Supreme Being is also shared by polytheism. In this context, Egypt becomes im portant for the simple reason that it was by far the best known polytheistic religion at the time. Even though the hieroglyphs were not yet deciphered and the mon uments not yet excavated and published, the body of Greek and Latin sources Cudworth showed that Casaubon made two mistakes. First, he was wrong in treating the whole corpus as one coherent text. His criticism affected only three of the seventeen independent treatises and his verdict of forgery applied at most to these three, but not to the corpus as a whole. Second, he was wrong in equating text and tradition. The text is late, that much Cudworth is ready to admit. But according to him, this must be taken as a terminus ad quern and not a quo; the text shows only how long the tradition was alive, not how late it came into being. And even the three "forgeries" must contain a kernel of truth; otherwise they would not have been successful. In this way, Cudworth was able to represent the doctrine 32 Warburton integrated Cudworth's ideas into his refor mulation of the Mosaic distinction, which appears now as "mystery" versus "rev elation." The truth is present on both sides: quite a revolutionary admission for a bishop. But the Egyptians and all the other religions deriving from Egypt were able to recognize and to transmit this truth only in the form of mystery, that is, as something reserved for the very few who were deemed able to grasp it-not as a permanent possession but as a quality known through rites that were bound to calendaric observances. Moses, on the other hand, made the truth the possession of the whole people and cast it in the form of a permanent Scripture. 33 Warburton's parallel to Giambattista Vico is striking. Vico, who, like Warbur ton, wanted to preserve the Mosaic distinction, interpreted it in the terms of sa cred and profane history. He asked how profane society and history were possible, and even worked well, when the various Gentile peoples were guided by reason (or "natural law") alone and were not granted the guidance of revelation. 34 Both reason and revelation must therefore contain the truth. Reason, however, was insecure, always endangered by error, and the result of a long and winding pro cess of evolution, whereas revelation was pristine, permanent, and secure. Beyond preserving the Mosaic distinction, though, Vico and Warburton had still another trait in common: their interest was focused on the "pagan" side, profane history and mystery religion. The first step of secularization was not the abolition of the distinction, but a shift of emphasis from the sacred to the profane.
Identity: Jehovah sive Isis
The step from mystery to identity might seem slight, because already in the paradigm of mystery, the truth is recognized on both sides of the Mosaic distinction. The new paradigm of identity does not claim that there is revelation on both sides, but that there is secrecy on both sides. Secrecy persists; even Moses did not reveal the full truth. Hence Lessing's idea of universal freemasonry: there have always been a few initiates or illuminates who sought the truth, which could be uncovered even after Moses' revelation, but only through a secret quest. 35 The truth is the same on both sides, but it is the possession of no one. In his book on the Hebrew mysteries, Reinhold identifies the God of the Bible as Isis, the Egyptian Supreme Being, by comparing God's self-presentation in Exodus 3.14 ("I am who I am") and Isis's self-presentation on the veiled image at Sais: "Brethren!" Reinhold exclaims, "Who among us does not know the ancient Egyptian inscriptions: the one on the pyramid at Sais: 'I am all that is, was, and will be, and no mortal has ever lifted my veil,' and that other on the statue of Isis: 'I am all that is'? Who among us does not understand as well as the ancient Egyp tian initiate himself did the meaning of these words and does not know that they express the essential Being, the meaning of the name Jehova?"
:,s While the saitic inscription is reported by Plutarch and (in a slightly different, thus independent, version) by Proclus, they speak only of one such inscription. The second one was probably invented by Voltaire, whom Reinhold is closely paraphrasing in this pas sage. 19 It serves Reinhold's purpose because it makes the equation more striking:
"I am all that is" and "I am who I am." The equation, however, does not seem so convincing to us. On the contrary, one proposition negates the other. When Isis says "I am all that is," she identifies herself with the world and abolishes the distinction between God and world. When Yahveh says "I am who I am," he explicitly draws the distinction between himself and the world and forecloses every link of identification. But Reinhold read the Bible in Greek. The Septuagint renders the divine name as "£go eimi ho on" [I am the Being one], which Reinhold understands (and which has always been understood) as meaning "I am essential Being." 40 This is already Isis. But the point that Reinhold wants to make is that the true God has no names, neither "Jehovah" nor "Isis." Both the saitic formula and the Hebrew formula are to be understood not as the revelation of a name, but rather as its witholding, or as the revelation of anonymity. God is all; every name falls short because it distinguishes God from something that is not God. Being all, God can not have a name. With this, we come back to Hermes Trismegistus. The pertinent fragment is preserved in Lactantius. Nicholas of Cusa quotes this passage in De docta ignorantia some decades before Marsilio Ficino's edition of the Hermetica:
It is obvious that no name can be appropriate to the Greatest One, because nothing can be distinguished from him. All names are imposed by distinguishing one from the other. Where all is one, there cannot be a proper name. Therefore, Hermes Trismegistus is right in saying: "because God is the totality of things [universitas rerum], he has no proper name, otherwise he should be called by every name or everything should bear his name. For he comprises in his simplicity the totality of all things. Conforming with his proper namewhich for us is deemed ineffable and which is the tetragrammaton . . . -his name should be interpreted as 'one and all' or 'all in one,' which is even better ['unus et omnia sive 'omnia uniter,' quod melius est]." 42 In this text, written in the middle of the fifteenth century, we already find the equation of the Hebrew tetragrammaton with Hermes Trismegistus's anonymous god, who is unus et omnia, "One and All," or hen kaipan, as this idea will be referred to by Cudworth and Lessing.
Nil novi sub sole?
It is true that we will find most of the leading ideas of the eighteenth century concerning the Mosaic distinction, nature and revelation, truth and religious tolerance, already present in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen turies. But we are not asking for first occurrences. The point is that these ideas did not disappear in the seventeenth century, as is generally believed. Although the seventeenth century was an age of orthodoxy that destroyed the harmonistic and eclectic dreams of the Renaissance, and although most of this period's reli gious and philosophical movements went occult or disappeared under the per secution of orthodox censorship, Spencer's, Gerardus Vossius's (15771649), 43 John Marsham's (160285), 44 and Cudworth's reinventions of Egypt led to a strong and mostly unknown revival of Hermeticism, pantheism, and other forms of Egyptophilia. These rehabilitations of the Egyptian tradition, furthermore, had the immense advantage of answering orthodox and historical criticism. The enlightened Egyptophilia of the eighteenth century reached its climax around 1780 when it merged with the ideas of nature and the sublime. During these years Lamoignon des Malesherbes coined the term cosmotheism to describe the Stoic worship of cosmos as a god. Cosmotheism more or less explicitly abol ishes the distinction between God and world. Friedrich Jacobi applied it to Ben edict Spinoza's deussive natura and Lessing's hen kaipan 4 '" a formula that Cudworth (1678) had shown to be the quintessential expression of ancient Egyptian theol ogy. The ancient Egyptians were thus cosmotheists just as the Stoics, the Neopla tonists, the Spinozists were. This idea, always present, returned in the years be tween 1785 and 1790 with an overwhelming force. In this new cosmotheistic movement, Isis was generally interpreted as "Na ture." Here is how Ignaz von Born, the Grand Master of True Concord and the model of Sarastro in Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's Magic Flute, summarized the ultimate aim of the Egyptian mysteries and of freemasonry:
The knowledge of nature is the ultimate purpose of our application. We worship this progenitor, nourisher, and preserver of all creation in the image of Isis. Only he who knows the whole extent of her power and force will be able to uncover her veil without punishment. 46 This passage combines Plutarch with Clement of Alexandria, who says: "The doctrines delivered in the Greater Mysteries concern the universe. Here all in struction ends. Things are seen as they are; and Nature, and the workings of Nature, are to be seen and comprehended." 47 On the last step of initiation, the adept is speechless in the face of nature. This idea inspired Schiller's ballad "The Veiled Image at Sais" and his essay "The Legation of Moses." 48 Like Warburton and Reinhold, Schiller constructed the Mosaic distinction as the antagonistic re lationship between official religion and mystery cult. In his opinion, secrecy was necessary to protect both the political order from a possibly dangerous truth and the truth from vulgar abuse and misunderstanding. For this reason, hieroglyphic writing and a complex ritual of cultic ceremonies and prescriptions were invented to shield the mysteries. They were devised to create a "sensual solemnity" (sinnliche Feierlichkeit) and to prepare, by emotional arousal, the soul of the initiate to receive the truth. At this point Schiller introduced the notion of the "sublime," associating it with the Hermetic idea of God's namelessness: "Nothing is more sublime than the simple greatness with which the sages speak of the creator. In order to distinguish him in a truly defining form, they refrained from giving him a name at all." 49 Appearing in the same year (1790), Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft associates the idea of the sublime with the second commandment, that is, with the idea of God's imagelessness: "There is perhaps no more sublime passage in the lawcode of the Jews than the commandment 'thou shalt not make unto thee any graven im age. . . .'" s " But in a footnote Kant mentions the veiled image at Sais and its in scription as the highest expression of the sublime:
Perhaps nothing more sublime was ever said or no sublimer thought ever expressed than the famous inscription on the temple of Isis (mother nature): "I am all that is and that shall be, and no mortal has lifted my veil." Segner availed himself of this idea in a suggestive vignette prefixed to his Natural Philosophy, in order to inspire beforehand the apprentice whom he was about to lead into the temple with a holy awe, which should dispose his mind to solemn attention.'' 1 Kant uses Schiller's language of initiation in describing Segner's vignette: "holy awe" (heiliger Schauer), "solemn attention" (j'eierliche Aufmerksamkeit). The main point of Kant's observation is to emphasize the initiatory function of the sublime. The sublime inspires in humans a holy awe and terror that only the The Mosaic Distinction strongest are able to withstand, so as to prepare soul and mind for the apprehen sion of a truth that can be grasped only in a state of exceptional fear and attention. Sublime secrets require a sublime environment. The connection of the sublime with wisdom, mystery, and initiation occurs again and again in the literature on the Egyptian mysteries. 52 But I would like to quote a text to which Carlo Ginzburg drew my attention: the Athenian Letters, anonymously published in London (1741 43). The following is a description of the "Hermetic cave" at Thebes, where the Egyptian initiates were supposed to be taught the doctrines of Hermes Trisme gistus as inscribed on the pillars of wisdom:
The strange solemnity of the place must strike everyone, that enters it, with a religious horror; and is the most proper to work you up into that frame of mind, in which you will receive, with the most awful reverence and assent, whatever the priest, who attends you, is pleased to reveal. . . . Towards the f arther end of the cave, or within the innermost recess of some prodigious caverns, that run beyond it, you hear, as it were a great way off, a noise resembling the distant roarings of the sea, and sometimes like the fall of" waters, dashing against rocks with great impetuosity. The noise is supposed to be so stunning and frightful, if you approach it, that few, they say, are inquisitive enough, into those mysterious sportings of nature. . . .
Surrounded with these pillars of lamps are each of those venerable columns, which I am now to speak of, inscribed with the hieroglyphical letters with the primeval mysteries of the Egyptian learning. . . . From these pillars, and the sacred books, they maintain, that all the philosophy and learning of the world has been derived. 53 This is the proper setting for the storage and transmission of secret wisdom. The more welltodo among the Freemasons of the time even tried to construct such an ambiance in their parks and gardens. The scenography for the trial by hre and water in the hnale from the second act of Mozart's Magic Flute envisages such a cave, where water gushes out with a deafening roar and fire spurts forth with devouring tongues. It is modeled not only upon Abbe Terrasson's description of Sethos's subterranean trials and initiation but also upon masonic garden ar chitecture, such as the grotto in the park at Aigen, near Salzburg, owned by Mo zart's friend and fellow mason, Basil von Amann. 5 ' The idea of the sublime-so important for the aesthetics of the time-and the interpretation of ancient Egyp tian art and architecture were practically inseparable from notions of mystery and initiation. According to Reinhold and Schiller, nature was the god in whose mysteries Moses was initiated during the course of his Egyptian education. But this was not the God Moses revealed to his people. In the school of the Egyptian mysteries, Moses not only learned to contemplate the truth but also "collected a treasure of hieroglyphs, mystical symbols and ceremonies" with which to build up a religion and to cover the truth under the protective shell of cultic institutions and pre scriptions-sub cortice legis, as Spencer had already formulated it. Schiller replaced Maimonides' and Spencer's idea of God's accommodation of the Law with the idea of Moses' accommodation of God. Religion and revelation, in this scheme, are only forms of accommodation.
Among the readers of Schiller's essay was Ludvvig van Beethoven, who wrote out the two "saitic inscriptions" and a quotation from the Orphic hymn on a leaf of paper and had this put under glass and in a frame. It stood on his writing table during the last years of his life:
I am all that is. I am all that was, is, and will be; and no mortal has ever lifted my veil.
He is the One who exists by himself, and to this single One all things owe their existence."
These sentences were held to be quintessential expressions of enlightened reli gion and, at the same time, of ancient Egyptian wisdom and theology. Equally emblematic of Egyptian theology was the Greek formula hen kai pan that Lessing wrote as his personal religious manifesto in the guestbook of a friend on 15 August 1780.™ When Jacobi published his conversations with Lessing in 1785, he launched the "pantheism debate" that held sway in Germany for almost fifty years." Cudworth could have launched the same debate a hundred years earlier.
But it was only on the eve of Napoleon's expedition to Egypt that the return of Egyptian cosmotheism and the abolition of the Mosaic distinction assumed the dimensions of a sweeping revolution. One might call it the "return of the repressed." When Freud resumed, in the 1930s, the discourse on Moses and Egypt, he was able to avail himself of an archaeological discovery that was inaccessible to all previous authors from Manetho to Schiller: that is, the discovery of Akhenaten and his monotheistic revolution. He was spared the trouble of inventing Egyptian mysteries in order to project Hermetic or Spinozistic theology back into Moses' times, and instead could point to an Egyptian monotheistic counterreligion as a historical fact. But even in his reconstruction secrecy returns, namely, in the form of latency. Freud's Moses did not translate or accommodate his truth to the ca pacities of the people but imposed it without compromise. Therefore he was mur dered. Yet it was precisely by being murdered and by becoming a traumatic and encrypted memory that he was able to create the Jewish people. This creation was a slow process, taking centuries and even millennia. His truth worked from within and manifested itself as a return of the repressed. In Freud's words, it "must first have undergone the fate ol being repressed, the condition of lingering in the unconscious, before it is able to display such powerful effects on its return and force the masses under its spell."''' 2 In this way, Moses the Egyptian and his mono theism "returned to the memory of his people." This repression is how Freud explains the coercive power that religion has over the masses. For Freud, religion is a compulsory neurosis that can only be treated by "remembering, repeating, working through" Freud's version of Baal Shem Tov's famous sentence: the secret of redemption is remembering. In the case of the Mosaic distinction, this remem bering has always turned toward Egypt. In this situation, it may be important to rediscover the Egypt of the eighteenth century repressed by nineteenthcentury positivism and historicism-just as the Egypt of the Renaissance had been rediscovered by the eighteenth century after a period of suppression, and as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries rediscovered prisca theologia in the Egypt (and its syncretistic cosmotheism) of late antiquity. The eighteenth century reopened a dialogue with an ancient Egyptian (or gen erally "pagan") cosmotheism that had been suppressed by orthodox and ratio nalistic fundamentalism. In the nineteenth century, this dialogue was again, and apparently forever, brought to an end by the decipherment of hieroglyphic writ ing and the rise of modern Egyptology, which relegated all Egyptophilic ideas to the museum of inventions and misunderstandings. Only recently has it become clear that there is a genuine Egyptian cosmotheistic tradition that has been op posed by the Mosaic distinction but has persisted as a countercurrent through all the different stages of Western monotheism until the eighteenth century and be yond. Those who referred to ancient Egypt in combating orthodox and f unda mentalist distinctions were not completely mistaken. And many of those who en gaged in the project of a scientific discovery of ancient Egypt and who opposed Egyptophilic traditions were ultimately, and more or less unwittingly, following the same agenda of natural religion and reason. It is always good to remember.
Latency, or the Return of the Repressed
Perhaps, however, this remembrance is not, after all, "the secret of redemp tion," but rather a technique of translation. I think that our aim cannot be to abolish distinctions and to deconstruct the spaces that were severed or cloven by them. What we need instead is the development of new techniques of intercultural translation, not in order to appropriate "the other," but to overcome the stereo types of otherness that we have projected onto the other by drawing distinctions. We are no longer dreaming of returning to Egypt or to the eighteenth century, with its ideas of tolerance. While this concept of tolerance was based on integration or generalization, what we need is a tolerance of recognition, which depends upon what is still beyond our reach: a real understanding of those religions that were rejected as "idolatry" by the Mosaic distinction.
Notes
The following essay is based on research completed during my stay at the J. Paul Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities at Santa Monica in 1994-95. The results of this research will be published in a book titled Moses the Egyptian: An Essay in Mnemohistory, forthcoming from Harvard University Press.
